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THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT CASES:
GOING "TOO FAR"
WITH JUDICIAL NEOFEDERALISM
James G. Wilson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning with Seminole Tribe v. Florida,' the Supreme Court's
recent Eleventh Amendment decisions are some of its worst in dec-
ades. The Court has diluted the constitutional and federal statutory
rights of millions of people. This Article uses several techniques to
support this bitter proposition.2 It first compares the Court's
* Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
1. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
2. Professor Mark Tushnet develops the contrary argument that the new
Eleventh Amendment cases can be read as part of the Court's reduced consti-
tutional aspirations. According to Tushnet, the cases do not completely pre-
clude federal power by still permitting individuals to seek injunctive relief.
See Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chas-
tening of ConstitutionalAspiration, 113 HARv. L. REv. 29, 72-76 (1998). But,
he also explores the alternative argument that the cases signify continued judi-
cial activism and a shift, not a reduction, in constitutional aspirations. See id.
at 77-82. John Jeffries argues that the impact of the Eleventh Amendment is
minimal because individuals can still use section 1983 to sue individual state
officials for damages. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh
Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 49 (1999). Certainly there
is enough chaos left in the doctrine to enable future justices to protect individ-
ual rights to a significant degree.
On the other hand, the Court is becoming ever more skeptical of the
"official capacity" concept. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 120 S. Ct.
631 (2000), the Court explicitly rejected Congress's attempt to use that alter-
native fiction to grant individuals full statutory protection. See id. at 637. This
Article fears the Court is no less ambitious than its predecessors and that its
reformulation of federalism is far from over. This Court's vision of progress is
the supremacy of private power to be achieved through the weakening of the
federal government and individual rights. The majority knows that multi-
national corporations face no serious threats from somewhat "sovereign"
states.
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"neofederalism" in the Eleventh Amendment context with two other
of the Court's states' rights inventions-constraints on Congress
through broader constructions of the Tenth Amendment and nar-
rower interpretations of the Commerce Clause-to demonstrate why
their Eleventh Amendment approach threatens basic democratic and
constitutional norms, including a humane form of federalism. The
Court's recent, unanimous validation in Reno v. Condon3 of congres-
sional regulation of state distribution of personal information ob-
tained from drivers license applications may offer the best we can
hope for from these neofederalist doctrines: numerous, complex, re-
sult-oriented outcomes that do not profoundly alter the political cul-
ture or economy. The Article then briefly considers Akhil Amar's
scintillating book, The Bill of Rights,4 to make an "intratextual" ar-
gument against the Court's Eleventh Amendment interpretation.
5
This provides a Fourteenth Amendment textual/historical argument
to be added to the obvious claim that neither the Eleventh Amend-
ment's text nor history warrant a broad construction of state sover-
eign immunity. Next, the Article explores some foreseeable conse-
quences of the Seminole Tribe doctrine, particularly its effects on
private power. Finally, this piece considers the doctrine's affinities
with the following: Richard Rorty's repudiation of "rights talk"; the
tendency of academic multiculturalists to reduce their analysis to
race and gender; some intellectual leftists' diminishment of the im-
portance of the "individual"; and the racist John C. Calhoun's nulli-
fication doctrine from the 1830s. Oddly enough, the more conserva-
tive wing of the Court is commingling extreme Southern
Constitutional theory from the Antebelleum era with some of the
trendiest theories of contemporary left-wing intelligentsia. At long
last, this portion of the left is seeing some of its concepts being
turned into power.
Because Eleventh Amendment doctrine contains so many fic-
tions, arbitrary distinctions, peculiar textual interpretations, and
3. 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000).
4. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1998).
5. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARv. L. REv. 747, 749
(1999) (discussing how, using an intratextual analysis, words used in one part
of the Constitution can be interpreted by looking to their usage elsewhere in
the document).
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incoherent outcomes6-confusing outcomes that are even less com-
prehensible now that the doctrine has become so broad and dy-
namic7 -it is worth stating at the outset how simple and fundamental
the basic issues are. Five members of the Court are determining how
far their judicially fabricated doctrine of "state sovereign immunity"
precludes private parties-including state employees, private citi-
zens, aliens, and private corporations-from suing states for alleged
violations of the United States Constitution and federal statutory
laws and, therefore, how much it prevents Congress from protecting
those rights. In other words, the doctrine elevates an implied state
power above numerous individual statutory rights, constitutional
rights, congressional authority, and vast amounts of constitutional
text.
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,8 the Court began the new
millenium by depriving state employees of their federal statutory
right to sue their employers for damages for flagrant violations of the
Age Discrimination Act (ADA).9 Under the sweeping reasoning of
these recent opinions, no constitutionally permissible justifications
exist for the nation to provide individuals with adequate legal
rights-rights which deter states from viciously discriminating
against their citizens because of physical handicap or by creating un-
safe working conditions. The doctrine is not confined to stripping
away rights of state employees-a group that has little political
popularity. The Court's remand of an ADA case against a state in
6. See, e.g., William Burnham, "Beam Me Up, There's No Intelligent Life
Here": A Dialogue on the Eleventh Amendment with Lawyers from Mars, 75
NEB. L. REv. 551 (1996) (discussing the flaws of Eleventh Amendment doc-
trine using a fictional conversation between the author and a Martian); William
Burnham, Taming the Eleventh Amendment Without Overruling Hans v. Lou-
isiana, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 931 (1990) (providing a less irreverent-and
thus less useful-analysis).
7. It is possible that the explosion in Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
will eventually force the Court to simplify the overall doctrine, creating vast
areas of state action in which the individual will only have the choices of going
to state court (which may have its own version of sovereign immunity pre-
venting any form of relief) or begging the federal government to intervene on
his or her behalf.
8. 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
9. See id. at 650; Age Discrimination Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1),
626(c)(1), 630(b) (1994).
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light of emerging Eleventh Amendment law will probably generate a
holding precluding both state employees and private persons from
suing states for damages even when the states treat them brutally.
Having already held that a private individual or corporation cannot
sue a state in federal court for violations of patent rights, even though
the Constitution authorizes congressional protection of patents, 10 the
majority will soon prevent private parties from suing states for sub-
stantially impairing contracts or for violating the Dormant Com-
merce Clause by penalizing out-of-state corporations."l While indi-
viduals still theoretically retain the right to seek injunctive relief, the
Court's broad reasoning threatens all prior rights, including the rem-
edy of injunctive relief.
II. THE GOOD, THE BAD, THE UGLY, AND THE VILE.
In recent years, the Supreme Court Justices have predictably di-
vided along partisan lines over federalism issues. All five hard-line
conservatives raise state power over individual rights and federal
power. The four more moderate members of the court label the vic-
tors as "judicial activists" 12 for imposing their own ideology on con-
gressional laws that were passed by the national electorate through a
system that structurally represents and protects state interests.13 This
repetitiveness of voting lineup, argument, and outcome can obscure
important distinctions between the different doctrinal approaches the
conservatives have taken. These distinctions reveal the particularly
vile nature of the Seminole Tribe line of decisions.
10. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say.
Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2210-11 (1999); see also College Say. Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2224 (1999)
(holding that trademarks are not "property" protected under the Constitution).
11. There is some historical authority supporting the claim that states did
not need to compensate individuals for Contract Clause violations. See Vicki
C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, The Eleventh Amendment, and State Sover-
eign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 124 n.494 (1988). Chief Justice Marshall
made it clear in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), that states
would not have such power to interfere with the national economy when he
struck down a state law attempting to rescind state land grants corruptly
granted to private investors. See id. at 137.
12. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 653-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
13. See id. at 651-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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A. The Good: New York v. United States
14
Whether one ultimately agrees with Justice O'Connor's opinion
in New York v. United States or not, she effectively refuted Justice
Blackmun's earlier argument in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority15 that the Supreme Court could not create reasona-
bly coherent, judicially enforceable Tenth Amendment doctrine.
Blackmun's judicial competence argument played a major role in
overruling National League of Cities v. Usery,16 which held that
Congress could not mandate states to pay their employees a mini-
mum wage or time-and-a-half for overtime. 17  According to the
Usery majority, Congress had invaded an "aspect of state sover-
eignty" and "traditional governmental functions," particularly the
power to structure internal employer-employee relationships.
18
Blacknun described how randomly lower courts had applied Usery's
vague "governmental function" balancing test.19  According to
Blackmun, such vagaries were inevitable. Indeed, it remains hard to
imagine how courts could apply such amorphous standards to a
myriad of state governmental operations, particularly now that so
many governmental functions have been privatized. By combining
the inability of the Court to create "judicially manageable standards"
with Professor Wechsler's famous claim that the states already had
adequate representation through the "political safeguards of federal-
ism,"20 Blackmun all but formally relegated Tenth Amendment is-
sues to the nonjusticiable political question doctrine.
2 1
14. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
15. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
16. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
17. See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism,
83 MICH. L. REV. 1709 (1985) (arguing that the alleged effectiveness of politi-
cal safeguards is not a proper judicial concern); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From
Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985
SuP. CT. REv. 341 (recommending a "process based" approach to federalism
issues).
18. NationalLeague, 426 U.S. at 852.
19. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 538-39.
20. Id. at 550-51 (citing Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the
National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954)).
21. Dean Choper proposed that federalism and separation of powers issues
should be nonjusticiable, saving the Court's judicial capital to protect individ-
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O'Connor's New York opinion did not revive Usery's ambigu-
ous terms, holding instead that the federal government could not pass
coercive laws that facially discriminate against states by forcing
them to assume the costs of regulating segments of the private econ-
omy. 22 Congress had "commandeered" the state legislative branches,
telling them how they had to spend state money to control their own
citizenry. By conceding that Congress could pass "generally appli-
cable" laws that equally coerce both individuals and states, she
avoided a direct confrontation with Garcia, which had upheld the
application of federal minimum wage and overtime requirements to a
municipal public transportation system.
23
This condemnation of congressional facial coercion of state
regulatory action is internally coherent, relatively easy for courts to
apply, consistent with a long string of Supreme Court precedent, and
justifiable under the reasoning that supports those precedents. 24 First
of all, the judicial branch has long been wary of governmental "coer-
cion." Two of the primary ends of the Constitution are to eliminate
private coercion through violence and slavery, and to constrain pub-
lic coercion, thereby achieving the ultimate goal of ordered liberty.
Although the term "coercion," like all major legal terms, has its pe-
culiar set of interpretive difficulties, it is far easier to diagnose than
the Usery concepts. Coerced parties are forced to act because they
have no sanction-free options.
In New York, Congress required the state of New York either to
take title to all privately held nuclear waste or continue its prior co-
operation with several fellow states in developing a regional compact
ual rights. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS (1980). The Eleventh Amendment cases are just several
of many examples of the Court's taking exactly the opposite approach-fo-
cusing on structural issues, often at the direct expense of individual rights.
22. See New York, 505 U.S. at 167; see also Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898 (1997) (extending the "anticoercion" doctrine to state executive offi-
cials); Candice Hoke, Constitutional Impediments to National Health Reform:
Tenth Amendment and Spending Clause Hurdles, 21 HASTINGS. CONST. L.Q.
489 (1994) (providing an early exploration after Garcia of the scope of the
Tenth Amendment and its relationship to the Spending Clause, which remains
a powerful congressional weapon).
23. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528.
24. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79
VA. L. REv. 633, 675-76 (1993) (applauding O'Connor's attempt to protect the
states' powers of immunity and initiation).
1692
JUDICIAL NEOFEDERALISM
to store that dangerous material. Either way, the state of New York
must follow Congress's orders. The statute was facially discrimina-
tory because it penalized only the states for their unique actions and
inactions, not states and private parties for common illegal activities.
In fact, the law relieved the relevant private parties of prior legal ob-
ligations.
The Court's hostility to facial discrimination in federalism cases
first arose in McCulloch v. Maryland.25 In McCulloch, Chief Justice
Marshall held that states could not tax the "operations" of a national
bank but could equally tax bank property, such as real estate, which
.the bank held in common with the rest of Maryland's inhabitants.
Marshall explained that there was no internal constraint on the states'
will to tax federal operations. Even if Maryland and their citizens
did not destroy the hated corporation through taxation, they would
profit from such taxes because they would receive the full amount of
the tax while previously paying a small portion of this amount in
federal taxes. Quite simply, there would be taxation without repre-
sentation. Widespread, facially neutral taxes on land, however, are
constitutional.26 Marshall apparently assumed that generally appli-
cable laws, by their very nature, are less likely to be tools of oppres-
sion. Local citizens are unlikely to raise their own property taxes to
obtain a tiny bit more income from federal properties. Ever since
McCulloch, the Court has been skeptical of many types of facial dis-
crimination, be it against religious minorities, political parties, or ra-
cial groups.
Under the condemned statute in New York, private utility corpo-
rations had convinced Congress to transfer their expenses to the
states. Congress should have passed a law equally coercing all ex-
isting owners of nuclear waste, including any state facilities. To
achieve such an egalitarian goal, it would have needed to overcome
the combined resistance of state and private power, a political hurdle
that reduces the likelihood of oppression. Given the amount of con-
trol private power has over Congress (as well as the states and the
presidency), such temptations are overwhelming. Thus, the states
not only were without the structural protection of generally
25. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
26. See id. at 436.
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applicable laws, but they also faced a system that encouraged the
private sector and the federal government to avoid their moral, finan-
cial, and legal responsibilities by shifting those burdens and account-
ability to another entity.
Ultimately, the decision in New York is not very troubling be-
cause it concerns the direct allocation of state and federal power, not
the rights of individuals. No person will be immediately injured or
unjustly discriminated against because the Commerce Clause does
not permit Congress to directly coerce the states into regulating the
private sector. After New York, Congress could still pressure the
states by passing generally applicable laws that either the United
States Attorney General or private individuals could enforce through
the federal courts. Congress also can regulate the private sector it-
self, preempting the states from any responsibilities.
B. The Bad: Term Limits v. Thornton
2 7
Term Limits v. Thornton is one of those cases that presents ana-
lytical difficulties because it contains equally powerful majority and
dissenting opinions. Relying on a variety of textual sources as well
as the earlier case of Powell v. McCormack,28 the Thornton majority
fashioned a bright-line rule striking down all state term limits on
those running for federal office. The dissent responded by noting
that the Constitution's age and residency requirements were aimed at
Congress, not the states. 29 After the Constitution's ratification, many
states had imposed property requirements upon those seeking elec-
tive office, including federal office. The dissent could have added
that all states prevented women from voting or running for federal
office.
In light of this rhetorical stalemate, the best opinion was Justice
Kennedy's concurrence that tipped the five-four decision against the
states. Rather than continue these fierce battles over the original
Framers' intentions and parse competing original text, Kennedy
27. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
28. 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (holding that the House of Representatives could
not prevent Adam Clayton Powell from assuming his seat in the House once he
satisfied the Constitution's textual requirements concerning age and resi-
dency).
29. See Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 874-84 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment's textual protection of
national citizenship prevented states from determining who could run
for federal office. By relying on the Civil War Amendments, which
textually confirmed the profound shift in the balance of power be-
tween the states and the national government, Kennedy derived from
President Lincoln's 30 more egalitarian, individual-rights focused
Constitution3' the national right to run for office without satisfying
such state conditions as term limits or property qualifications.
Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion becomes far more troubling
when one looks beyond his outcome and technical arguments to the
premises underlying those arguments. Thomas used the case to re-
visit the basic structure of the federal government. Instead of en-
dorsing Chief Justice Marshall's Hamiltonian vision that enthusiasti-
cally implied any appropriate means to achieve the national
government's broad ends, Thomas created a strong presumption
against federal power:
The federal government and the states thus face different
default rules: where the Constitution is silent about the ex-
ercise of a particular power-that is, where the Constitution
does not speak expressly or by necessary implication-the
federal government lacks that power and the states enjoy it.
These basic principles have been enshrined in the Tenth
Amendment.
32
Whether he knew it or not, Thomas's default rule has an inter-
esting judicial pedigree. In Dred Scott v. Sandford,33 Chief Justice
Taney held the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional because,
"[t]his [federal] government was to be carefully limited in its powers,
and to exercise no authority beyond those expressly granted by the
Constitution or necessarily to be implied from the language of the in-
strument, and the objects it was intended to accomplish . . .34
30. See id. at 821 (quoting Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address
(1863)).
31. See generally GARY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS
THAT REMADE AMERICA (1992) (examining the Gettysburg Address in its
historical and cultural context).
32. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 848.
33. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
34. Id. at 435 (emphasis added).
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Taney's construction appears to be broader than Thomas's default
rule; at least the federal government can turn to its purposes to justify
its use of power. It seems not just odd, but even irresponsible to re-
vive a cluster of arguments that helped cause the Civil War and its
Reconstruction Amendments, all of which emerged long after the
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. Of course, we will not know the
meaning of Thomas's grandiose default rule until we see how it is
applied (or not applied) over a series of cases. Reno v. Condon35 in-
dicates that the rule may be more rhetoric than reality. Nevertheless,
this default rule creates a principle that states and individuals can in-
variably rely upon to narrow federal power. Whenever the state and
individual interests are similar, they can use Thomas's premises to
protect themselves.
C. The Ugly: United States v. Lopez
36
In 1995, for the first time in decades, the Supreme Court held
that Congress had exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause
in United States v. Lopez. Just as the conservatives had jettisoned
text and history to interpret the Eleventh Amendment, they ignored
any alleged preference for "bright-line rules" 37 to create an elaborate,
multi-factor balancing test which concluded, in the words of Justice
O'Connor's concurrence, that the federal government had gone "too
35. 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000).
36. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
37. See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as the Law of Rules, 56
U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989) (exploring the dichotomy between general rules
of law and judicial discretion). Justice Scalia maintains that formal rules are
particularly important in cases involving such "structural safeguards" as sepa-
ration of powers:
[T]he doctrine of separation of powers is a structural safeguard rather
than a remedy to be applied only when specific harm, or risk of spe-
cific harm, can be identified. In its major features (of which the con-
clusiveness of judicial judgments is assuredly one) it is a prophylactic
device, establishing high walls and clear distinctions because low
walls and vague distinctions will not be judicially defensible in the
heat of interbranch conflict.
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, 514 U.S. 211,239 (1995).
Justice Scalia has been remarkably silent while consistently joining the
neofederalists' use of balancing tests.
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far.",38 In fact, they destroyed the existing bright-line rule of almost
complete deference in such cases. As in the earlier constitutional
cases of National League of Cities v. Usery39 and Morrison v. Ol-
sen,40 Chief Justice Rehnquist provided numerous reasons in his plu-
rality decision for invalidating the legislation-reasons that immedi-
ately become contestable factors in subsequent litigation. Among
these, Congress had exceeded its powers under the Commerce
Clause by not making any findings, not permitting courts to make an
independent determination of jurisdiction in particular cases, crimi-
nalizing noneconomic activity, not showing any "substantial effect"
of guns in schools on interstate commerce, and regulating the inher-
ently local issue of public education.41 Concurrences by Justices
Kennedy and Thomas added even more variables of uncertain sig-
nificance. 42
This is an ugly can of worms. However the Court resolves these
issues in later cases, it will be forced to second-guess Congressional
supervision of the national economy by determining which activities
"cause" "substantial effects" on interstate commerce.
Whenever the Court enters a new area, be it sexual reproduction
or separation of church and state, it invariably must make awkward
distinctions, distinctions that reflect the Justices' underlying political
preferences. Perhaps some Justices will see federal regulation of
hospitals differently than protection of schools. Other Justices will
find Congressional "findings" to be adequate in some situations but
not others.43 One or two Justices may be satisfied with individual-
ized hearings, an approach that would reduce the doctrine to empty
formality.
Just as the separation of church and state cases can swing on the
existence of a clown figure or a teddy bear next to a creche,4 4 so
38. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 578.
39. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
40. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
41. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-68 (discussing congressional power to enact
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990).
42. See id. at 568-603 (Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
43. In Reno, the Court pointed out that the states had sold the information to
private parties for millions of dollars. See Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666,
668 (2000).
44. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984).
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Congress's power to regulate commerce will become an arcane spe-
cialty that will delight litigators and doctrinal technicians who at-
tempt to reconcile the surreal. Most importantly, this confusion un-
dercuts one of the goals of our constitutional system: to make
simple, clear allocations of power so the citizenry can know whom to
blame or praise. In the future, the Court will be in the middle of yet
more finger pointing.
Reno's validation of congressional supervision over the state
control of information more than satisfies this Article's prediction of
continuing confusion. The unanimous Court did not reach the malle-
able "substantial effects" doctrine because it held that such private
information was a valuable "instrument of commerce."45 This hold-
ing raises the obvious question of why the sale and potential resale of
that valuable commodity called information is "interstate commerce"
while firearms are not. After all, the defendant Lopez may have
brought the gun to school to sell it to one of his classmates. The
major distinction appears to be the merits: All nine Justices like their
personal privacy enough to overcome the Thornton "default rule"
against federal power, while only four are worried enough about
hand gun control and violence in schools to defer to the democrati-
cally elected Congress.
Reno also limited the potential scope of Lopez by concluding
that Congress could prohibit not just the "sale," but also the "trans-
fer" of the information provided by individuals seeking a driver's li-
cense. 46 Lopez could have been expanded to preclude any congres-
sional action concerning activities in which there had been no
commercial transaction. That broader doctrine would have limited
congressional power to prohibition of state sales, not mere posses-
sion or free transfers.47
Whenever new Justices join the Court, they will impose their
own idiosyncratic constructions upon the doctrine. Assuming these
doctrines survive, there is little reason to believe that more centrist
and liberal Justices will not eventually use them. If I were a Justice,
I would be tempted to manipulate the doctrines to invalidate
45. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 671.
46. See id.
47. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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whatever federal laws I really disliked. It would rarely be difficult
for me to find a lack of "substantial effects," "instruments of com-
merce," or inadequate congressional findings of "widespread viola-
tions." Why should the other side have all the fun? Constitutional
jurisprudence concerning congressional power will look like it did a
century ago. Fluctuating majorities will ban federal actions they dis-
like, such as regulation of child labor (then) or worker's hours (now
and then), and validate actions they want, such as the banning of lot-
tery tickets (then) and the protection of privacy (now). Within
twenty years, we will have a hodge-podge of caselaw, with a phalanx
of cases on both sides that will rival substantive due process and the
First Amendment in its complexity.
All this clumsiness is not completely cataclysmic, particularly if
subsequent majorities confine Lopez's scope to criminal law. After
all, the judicially validated power of the states and the federal gov-
ernment to bring separate criminal trials against a defendant for the
same episode is contrary to the spirit, if not the technical meaning, of
the Double Jeopardy Clause.48 It will merely mean that the federal
government will have no jurisdiction to investigate many kidnap-
pings and terrorist bombings.
For those who wish to impose their libertarianism upon the rest
of us through constitutional law, the case has great potential. As-
suming that O'Connor and Kennedy remain as committed to con-
gressional power to regulate the national economy as they stated in
their Lopez concurrence, 49 the Justices may eventually permit Con-
gress to only regulate the economy and never use criminal law to
control social issues. For instance, Congress may not be able to pass
a law penalizing homosexuality. Such a constriction of federal
power simultaneously enhances some individual rights and state
power. On the other hand, the doctrine severely limits Congress's
ability to protect human rights from more local abuses. The conser-
vatives probably would hold that Congress does not have the power
to prevent the states from criminalizing homosexual behavior. Such
progressive legislation would not be warranted under the Commerce
48. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 2 ("[N]or shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.").
49. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Clause because consensual sex (with the exception of prostitution)
probably would not be an "instrument of commerce."
D. The Vile: Seminole Tribe v. Florida5 °
Consistent with their purported "textualist" commitments, the
existing bloc of the five most conservative Justices of the Supreme
Court like to start51 their enthusiastic reading of state sovereign im-
munity by quoting the text of the Eleventh Amendment: "The Judi-
cial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another state, or by Citizens or Sub-
jects of any Foreign state." 52 The text of that amendment, passed in
response to a Supreme Court opinion that authorized an out-of-state
private party to sue a state, only precludes diversity jurisdiction law-
suits by outsiders against states.53 Nevertheless, one hundred years
ago in Hans v. Louisiana,54 the Supreme Court extended that immu-
nity to causes of actions that citizens brought against their own
states. 55 The Court subsequently dampened the potential effects of
that doctrine by creating the legal fiction that individuals could still
sue state officials, acting in their official capacity, whenever those
officials transgressed federal constitutional or statutory law. 56 In ad-
dition, Congress could always pass a statute abrogating state sover-
eign immunity to effectively protect a particular federal right.57
50. 517 U.S. 44 (1966)
51. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. ofRegents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 640 (2000).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
53. Many academics believe the Court should strictly construe this particu-
lar piece of constitutional text. See Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment
and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515
(1978); William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261 (1989); see also Wil-
liam P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical
Evaluation, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1372 (1989) (providing a contrary view inter-
preting the text more broadly).
54. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
55. See Suzanna Sherry, The Eleventh Amendment and Stare Decisis: Over-
ruling Hans v. Louisiana, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1260 (1990).
56. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908).
57. For arguments in favor of giving Congress the "last word" on the scope
of Eleventh Amendment immunities, see John E. Nowak, The Scope of Con-
gressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and
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Nevertheless, Hans periodically inflicted brutal harm. The Su-
preme Court held in Edelman v. Jordan58 that the Eleventh Amend-
ment prevented welfare recipients from obtaining retroactive benefits
that a state had unlawfully withheld.59 The plaintiffs were only al-
lowed to seek injunctive relief guaranteeing future payments.6 ° Wel-
fare recipients might have some "property" rights to those benefits,
at least enough to justify a pretermination hearing under Goldberg v.
Kelly,61 but those rights did not extend to any of that property which
the state had illegally withheld. Quite simply, this form of constitu-
tionally protected property could be illegally "taken" for any reason
without any compensation. As bad as decisions like Jordan were,
6 2
they provided an ultimately democratic solution. Congress could
pass a law eliminating that immunity by "clearly stating" that the
states had to provide retroactive payments to those welfare recipients
they had treated illegally. At least the last word on such a conten-
tious political issue would remain within the electoral system. Sadly,
both Democratic and Republican Congresses confirmed the heart-
lessness of the Court by never providing the recipients with a statu-
tory right to seek back benefits.
In Seminole Tribe, five Justices began eliminating the portions
of Eleventh Amendment doctrine that limited the scope of Hans.
The Court determined that Congress could not abrogate state's sov-
ereign immunity rights when the abrogation involved Congress's
plenary power over Native Americans under the "Indian Commerce
the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
1413 (1975) and Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litiga-
tion, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies
About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REv. 682 (1976).
58. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
59. See id. at 658-59.
60. See id. at 677.
61. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
62. The Court initially tried to solve the problem by requiring that Congress
give a "clear statement" of its intentions to abrogate state immunity. See
Pennhurst v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984); see also Erwin Chemerinsky,
State Sovereignty and Federal Court Power: The Eleventh Amendment After
Pennhurst v. Halderman, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643, 646-47 (1985) (dis-
cussing the procedural history of Pennhurst). See generally David L. Shapiro,
Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARv. L.
REv. 61 (1984) (discussing the rationale behind, and effect of, the Pennhurst
decision).
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Clause." 63 Congress previously gave Native American tribes the
right to sue states if the states did not make a "good faith" effort to
enter into a compact over the establishment of gambling on reserva-
tions.64 Probably sensing that their ideology could not be wholly de-
rived from the narrow, explicit terms of the Eleventh Amendment,
the neofederalists also based their novel stance upon a sweeping
doctrine of state sovereign immunity that they "implied" from the
overall constitutional structure. Their definition of sovereign immu-
nity was very broad: "It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not
to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent."65 So
much for the notion that every human and every institution in
America is legally accountable for their illegal acts.
The thin majority created two important exceptions. First, it
held that the federal government could bring suits against the states
for violations of federal law even if individuals could not. Inherent
in their definition of state "sovereignty" is a profound denigration of
individual sovereignty, with only a partial reduction of federal sover-
eignty. Individuals had become constitutional guinea pigs; they did
not have any rights in many areas until either the executive branch
felt pressured to act on their behalf or until enough of them were so
badly injured that Congress could make findings that the Court
would then find satisfactory. In other words, those who were earlier
injured or had no access to executive power would be left without
remedy.
The Court had created a constitutional double standard: The
Executive Branch could sue states for flagrant violations of the Con-
stitution and federal law based upon the Constitution, but individuals
could not. The nature of state sovereignty thereby indirectly reduced
federal sovereignty by eliminating one of its most effective remedial
weapons-giving individuals the right to sue to protect their own
federal and constitutional rights.
Second, Congress could enable individuals to protect their rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment simply because it was passed after
the Eleventh Amendment. The Court thereby created two
63. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73.
64. See id. at 49 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3) (overturned 1996)).
65. Hans, 134 U.S. at 13.
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Constitutions where there had been one; individuals could no longer
directly turn to any of the text prior to the Fourteenth Amendment-
a holding that apparently permits the states to use slaves since the
Thirteenth Amendment also predated the Fourteenth. The five Jus-
tices also overruled a case, decided seven years earlier, upholding
Congress's power to protect individual rights under the Commerce
Clause. Finally, the Court narrowly construed the "fiction" that the
plaintiffs were only suing "state officials," not the state itself Dis-
traught by the majority's holding, the dissent presciently warned that
other constitutional rights, such as patent rights, would be threat-
ened.66
Three years later, the Court dramatically expanded its new state
sovereign immunity doctrine beyond the technical area of Native
American rights in the holdings of three cases. In Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank
67
and College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educa-
tion Expense Board,68 the Court held that private corporations could
not sue a state for either false advertising or patent violations, even
though the original Constitution explicitly protects patent rights.
While conceding that patents were "property" that might warrant
some Fourteenth Amendment protection, the Court created a variety
of legalistic, technical hurdles to preclude this particular litigation.
First, Congress had to show a pattern of state violations before act-
ing. Congress should also determine that existing state remedies
were inadequate. In addition, individuals could no longer bring these
lawsuits, only the federal government could bring suit since the fed-
eral government is not a lowly individual that would offend the
state's inherent sovereignty. Finally, the Court did not accept Con-
gress's authorizing plaintiffs to bring their suits against state officials
"acting in their official capacity," thereby cutting back on that useful
fiction which limited Hans. Individuals no longer have a vast array
of legal rights providing them with legal remedies; all they retain is
the opportunity to request the federal government to intervene on
66. See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 120 (holding the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act's creation of a private cause of action against state employers an
invalid abrogation of the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity).
67. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
68. 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
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their behalf Of course, they can also ask the state to pass laws
waiving sovereign immunity. The Court handled the "false adver-
tising" claim even more cavalierly, finding no "property" interest
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Alden v. Maine,69 the Court held that Congress could not
permit Maine probation officers to sue their employer for violating
the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It offered
yet another variation of its aggressive jurisprudence: "although the
sovereign immunity of the States derives at least in part from the
common-law tradition, the structure and the history of the Constitu-
tion make clear that the immunity exists today by constitutional de-
sign."70 The very passivity and awkwardness of the sentence reveals
the Court's ambition. First of all, Hans's judicial activism fades into
the generality, hedged by the word "although," of "the common law
tradition," a polite euphemism for judicial creativity. In addition, the
Court fails to tell us whose "constitutional design" is "today" so
"clear" and why it is so "clear" when nobody had ever thought of it
before. Nor does the Court tell us what "history" they are relying on
that makes the issue so "clear." Certainly Alexander Hamilton never
envisioned the possibility of widespread state immunity from most of
the Constitution. The Supremacy Clause, which includes federal
statutes and constitutional rights, more than implies that the states are
subordinate to all legitimate federal power. It is hard to imagine
Chief Justice Marshall endorsing this statist definition of sovereignty
at either the state or federal level; apparently Marbury should not
have brought his suit against Madison because that individual cause
of action is an insult to federal sovereignty. The word "structure" is
also problematic. When Charles Black analyzed that method of con-
stitutional reasoning, he observed that it was a type of policy argu-
ment, not some special mode of constitutional rhetoric that miracu-
lously transcends political considerations. 71 It is absurd to design
69. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
70. Id. at 2256. See generally George D. Brown, State Sovereignty Under
the Burger Court-How the Eleventh Amendment Survived the Death of the
Tenth: Some Broader Implications ofAtascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 74
GEO. L. REv. 363 (1985) (discussing competing theories on the nature of
states' Eleventh Amendment rights).
71. See generally CHARLES BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969) (discussing the foundations and processes un-
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structures without considering the systems' purposes and foreseeable
outcomes that will frustrate or fulfill those goals. But the Seminole
Tribe majority never explores purposes and outcomes, and never ex-
plains why it is such a good thing for individuals to have fewer
fights. Perhaps the Court is simply saying that it is designing the
Constitution based upon its particular conception of the Constitu-
tion's structure along with its skewed reading of history. This his-
tory seems to primarily consist of a "common law case" that the
Court tries to downplay, while still complaining about the dissent's
refusal to accept Hans as the pivotal case in this area of contempo-
rary constitutional Law.
72
Leaving aside for the moment the question of who should con-
duct a federalist revival, what are some good reasons for resuscitat-
ing federalism? Federalists claim that state and local governments
are more accessible, accountable, and responsive than the massive
federal bureaucracy concentrated in Washington, D.C. These gener-
alities are partially true; however, the national government is some-
times more willing to adapt to felt necessities than local governments
captured by various factions. Furthermore, one of the ways that state
and local governments remain responsive is through the threat of liti-
gation. Most individuals are unlikely to have much power at the
state level, just as they have even less influence at the national level.
The real beneficiaries of increased state power will be organized in-
stitutions, particularly private corporations and localized special in-
terest groups. One of the glories of having meaningful rights is that a
single person can call an entire government to account, search its re-
cords, force it to justify its actions, and gain significant relief if a
court finds the government acted illegally. That power, which re-
mains quite unpredictable so long as individuals control it, has been
one of the central aspects of American citizenship, at both the state
and federal level, and one of the sources of our unique form of de-
mocracy as tempered by judicial review.
One can still be an enthusiastic states' right advocate and not
endorse the Court's judicial activism. The proper venue for resolv-
ing most federalism issues (perhaps excluding such egregious insults
derlying constitutional analysis).
72. See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 643.
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as the coercion in New York v. United States73) is the polling booth.
The people can use their electoral power to reallocate authority be-
tween the state and federal governments to create the most efficient
and accountable governmental system. Who is more likely to accu-
rately feel the effects of any particular mix of state and federal
power: the populace or nine successful, upper-middle class lawyers
with lifetime appointments to a job which makes almost everyone
fawn over them? The Constitution should primarily be organic and
democratic, not abstract and elitist.
Overall, the five Justices have created a series of hurdles to pre-
vent elected members of the federal government from protecting in-
dividuals against state oppression. For at least four of the Justices,
the federal government must first overcome Thornton's default pre-
sumption against federal power. Second, the federal government
must show that the state's activity fits within the Court's complicated
definition of the Commerce Clause. Even when the federal govern-
ment has satisfied these amorphous requirements, it usually cannot
create any individual rights. All it can do is give the executive
branch the power to enforce these laws and the Constitution against
the states. Thus, one possible outcome of this doctrine will be a huge
increase in federal litigation against the states-not a consequence
very conducive to comity.
Guided by the penumbras and emanations of the Tenth and
Eleventh Amendments, which are less than clear to me, the majority
can fashion and apply this doctrine however they wish. Furthermore,
all these novelties will interact in unforeseeable ways. Because the
Eleventh Amendment now prevents Congress from creating a statute
permitting individuals to protect their privacy rights concerning
driver's license applications, the Court is under additional pressure to
permit the federal government to expand its direct coercive powers
over the states, as it did in Reno v. Condon.74 We will soon have an
elaborate doctrine of federal coercion: the federal courts can coerce
the states whenever the Supreme Court feels such power is appropri-
ate; Congress can coerce the states through authorizing executive en-
forcement of generally applicable laws; Congress can coerce the
73. 505 U.S. 144, 149-54 (1992).
74. See 120 S. Ct. 666, 672 (2000).
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states whenever five Justices like the underlying legislation; and all
the while the individual becomes ever more powerless.
It is no longer "clear" why individuals should have any right to
injunctive relief against the states and its agents under Ex parte
Young since injunctions also permit an individual to "insult" sover-
eignty by forcing states to reallocate their income, thereby creating
an "unfunded mandate., 75  Nothing in the text of the Eleventh
Amendment requires the Court to maintain its distinction between
injunctions and damages because the text is silent about all of these
issues.
Because the Justices will be under great pressure to allow the
federal government to directly coerce the states some of the time,
now that it can no longer use the indirect technique of giving indi-
viduals the power to coerce the states through damage actions, the
doctrine of coercion will get more complex. In Reno, Chief Justice
Rehnquist explained that Congress was not requiring the states to do
anything within the private economy; Congress was merely limiting
state action.76 Distinguishing between coerced action and coercion
to prevent action will be no easy task. Indeed, it may well turn out
that New York's coercion doctrine will not be judicially manageable
over the long run, undermined by the Court's other more dubious
federalism doctrines.
Congress can still occasionally create individual rights when it
follows the Court's invariably unpredictable, fluid, and idiosyncratic
definitions of the Fourteenth Amendment. If a group of Borkians
ever gained control of the Court, their decision that gender discrimi-
nation does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's text and history
would lead to a subsequent decision outlawing all Congressional
laws against state sexual discrimination. The Court has also closed
off the possibility of Congress generously expanding the definitions
of "privileges," "equality," or "due process of law" in City of Boerne
v. Flores.77 The Court will closely scrutinize any Congressional
legislation made under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
75. See, e.g., Nathan C. Thomas, Note, The Withering Doctrine of Ex parte
Young, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1068 (1998) (describing earlier concerns about
the fate of this doctrine).
76. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 672.
77. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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make sure it is "remedial," 78 consistent with the Court's current
Fourteenth Amendment doctrine, which could change tomorrow, and
"proportional 79 to widespread violations. Notice how even this ex-
ception creating a limited set of individual federal rights reduces
constitutional rights to systemic considerations at the expense of in-
dividual sovereignty. Congress can only authorize individuals to sue
states after states have already violated many individuals' rights.
Thus, the individual as an individual has few, if any, clear rights
against the states. The individual must be part of a victimized group
that generates enough power and sympathy to persuade Congress to
attempt to provide statutory protection. And then, of course, this
group must convince the Court that Congress has made appropriate
findings and fashioned appropriate remedies. In other words, many
people must suffer flagrant injustices before the Court will even con-
sider permitting Congress to act. This approach puts even more
weight on the already overloaded Fourteenth Amendment. In the
future, the Court and its various interpretations of the Fourteenth
Amendment will be the center of the Constitution, perhaps the only
source of limited individual rights. It is also worth remembering that
the Court may create additional neofederalist hurdles in the future,
such as closing off such openings as suing state officials in "their of-
ficial capacity," or preventing anyone from getting monetary dam-
ages against the state without its permission. By definition, all dam-
ages are coercive sanctions that interfere with the state's financial
ordering of priorities. The text does not prevent the Court from im-
plying ever more state powers and continually limiting federal pow-
ers and individual rights. After all, "today" it is all part of the "con-
stitutional design."
The Court is creating a Constitution upon the political premises
that there are only two problems really worth remedying-the gov-
ernment's use of racial and sexual categories-and there is little rea-
son to fear new modes of state tyranny in the future. So if somebody
has a disease such as AIDS, or some fiendish group finds a new ar-
bitrary category to split the populace into warring factions, Congress
can do nothing until the Court deigns to act under the Fourteenth
78. See id. at 519.
79. See id. at 520.
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Amendment. To the degree that the Court adheres to its existing
Fourteenth Amendment analysis, which primarily studies history to
determine which forms of oppressions are unconstitutional, new
forms of injustice will, by definition, remain beyond any federal
remedy. In the past, the Court and Congress could grope along in an
awkward partnership when they combated local tyranny. The Civil
Rights movement is a compelling story of different branches of the
federal government leading at different times. In fact, the Court of-
ten justified its activism by referring to similar actions by the elected
branches. But in the future, the Court must first act on its own before
Congress can begin to combat injustice. Even then, Congress must
proceed carefully lest it exceed its limited remedial powers under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
III. A BRIEF "INTRATEXTUALIST" RESPONSE
Clearly, the best thing is to eliminate this "clear" Eleventh
Amendment doctrine, whether by using judicial overrulings or even
a constitutional amendment explicitly limiting state sovereign immu-
nity to diversity cases in federal court. The next best thing is to sub-
vert the Court's approach through its own terms. Akhil Reed Amar's
recent book, The Bill of Rights, provides ample textual, historical,
and doctrinal support to permit future courts to construe into oblivion
the Court's constitutional numerology that divides our Constitution
in four parts: the original document, the incorporated parts of the
Bill of Rights, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Fourteenth
Amendment. 80 Of course, Amar's careful documentation and nu-
anced interpretations need to be read to appreciate the power of his
vision. Amar makes particularly effective use of the longstanding
argument he has identified as "intratextualism." From the very be-
ginning, the Court has sought to interpret the Constitution by not just
focusing on a single clause, but by comparing that clause with other
constitutional clauses containing similar text or purposes. One of the
virtues of Amar's book is that it generates a few easily understood
arguments and legal principles that many Americans-hopefully
most-still find important and legitimate. Historically, the
80. See generally AMAR, supra note 4 (arguing that the Constitution and its
Amendments should be construed as one unit).
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Fourteenth Amendment reflected not just the defeat of slavery and
southern imperialism; its Framers designed it to protect all American
citizens from systemic state injustices, particularly the deprivation of
federal constitutional and statutory rights. In particular, the Radical
Republicans never wanted to see states viciously violate citizens'
First Amendment right to free speech as southern slave states had
relentlessly done to abolitionists before the Civil War. Nor did they
want the southern states to interfere with the citizens' federal right to
receive mail.
Amar concludes that the Framers intended the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect all fed-
eral constitutional and statutory rights.81 The first sentence of the
Fourteenth Amendment effectively overrules that part of Dred Scott
depriving all African Americans of their national citizenship. 2 From
this point forward, all Americans would possess the complete rights
afforded by state and national citizenship. The next Clause of the
Amendment sets forth those rights in the most generous terms avail-
able: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States." 83 At
the time of the Fourteenth Amendment, "privileges" was a synonym
for "rights." The Clause does not distinguish between federal statu-
tory and federal constitutional rights. It does not limit itself to the
Bill of Rights, but includes the entire original Constitution. It is an
integrative document both politically and structurally. It maintains
one Constitution where the Seminole Tribe majority has created two.
Thus, all preexisting individual federal rights are incorporated into
the Fourteenth Amendment, leapfrogging the Eleventh's alleged ob-
stacles.
This Article will not develop and document this doctrinal argu-
ment fully. Amar will hopefully provide his own Eleventh Amend-
ment analysis. 84 Perhaps he will also argue that the state's ability to
81. See id. at 181-87.
82. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Dred Scott v. Sanford, 393
U.S. (19 How.) 393, 406-07 (1857) (holding that African Americans should
not be afforded U.S. citizenship).
83. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
84. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96
YALE L.J. 1425, 1426 (1987) (sovereignty and federalism designed to protect
individual rights).
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violate federal constitutional and statutory rights violates "due proc-
ess" and "equal protection." After all, there is a basic assumption
that all Americans have equal rights of national citizenship and can-
not have those rights taken away without "due process of law," a
phrase that seems to waive state sovereign immunity across the
board. It seems wrong that citizens of one state will have far more
constitutional and statutory rights than citizens of another state, de-
pending upon the scope of their state's sovereign immunity. Even in
its baldest form, Amar's approach indicates that the Seminole Tribe
line of decisions violates the text, history, and purposes of not just
the original Constitution and the Eleventh Amendment, but also the
Fourteenth Amendment. All the Court really has to legitimatize it-
self is a judicially active "common law tradition"; one vague
amendment, the Tenth; one overly precise amendment, the Eleventh;
and a set of vicious axioms that it has no desire or ability to apply
consistently.
IV. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND PRIVATE POWER
Most contemporary constitutional analysis breaks the system
down into three or four components: the federal government, the
states, the individual, and perhaps the People as a background source
of sovereignty. At this stage in history, such a perspective obscures
the real nature of our Constitution. If one believes that Aristotle's
definition of a "constitution" as the allocation of wealth and power is
still relevant, and reflected in constitutional understanding through
such sources as Madison's Federalist Number Ten,85 then one needs
to subdivide the private part of the Constitution just as one needs to
subdivide the federal and state governments to understand how
power flows. One needs to pay close attention to the struggle be-
tween "the few" and "the many" and the distribution and regulation
of private power. This inquiry quickly reveals the crucial constitu-
tional distinction between the individual and such organized entities
as private corporations, unions, and other institutions. Indeed, the
Fourteenth Amendment contains this very distinction, providing
"privileges" and "immunities" only to real human beings, but offer-
ing "equal protection" and "due process of law" to all
85. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
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"persons"--which a previously judicially active Supreme Court
quickly extended to private corporations. This textual distinction
could be combined with the Seminole Tribe's approach to create con-
stitutional doctrine which is, in some ways, attractive-although the
value of imposing such views through clever legalisms is question-
able. Individual American citizens would have full federal and con-
stitutional rights under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Corpo-
rations must turn to states, which grant their charters, for any rights.
Nor could they enforce their rights against the states unless the states
waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Of course, reality is far more depressing than such fantasy doc-
trine. When one studies the history of federalism in the United
States, states' rights advocates usually favored federalism to protect
something else. Initially, the slave owners relied on federalism be-
cause they knew the federal government was the greatest threat to
their peculiar institution. Later, racists relied upon states' rights to
protect the continued subordination of African Americans through
segregation and violence. So what are the five Justices interested in
protecting now, or are they merely disinterested spectators commit-
ted to a particular structure because they think it will generally pro-
tect "tyranny"?
The major beneficiary of increasing some states' rights at the
expense of federal powers will be private corporations. Like the sla-
vocracy before it, private power instinctively recognizes that national
government poses the greatest threat to its control of American soci-
ety. Neofederalism is one of several doctrines the Court has de-
signed to divide and conquer democratic public power and cripple
the labor movement so private power can continue turning this
country into a more economically polarized society, no longer en-
cumbered by "pampered" private and public employees.
Defenders of the Supreme Court can reply that the recent feder-
alism cases refute such vulgar marxism. In the Florida Prepaid
cases, private corporations lost the right to protect their patents and86
copyrights through damage actions. Indeed, it is easy to refute
86. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say.
Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999) (holding that the Patent Remedy Act cannot be
sustained under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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marxist analysis if one requires that every single case benefit the
stronger, richer party. Counter examples are inevitable because
some cases involve competition between two powerful entities and
other cases favor weaker interests. The real question is who benefits
in the long run. Imagine that a state starts selling its own copies of
Windows 20009. Microsoft would immediately get an injunction in
federal court. It would join other powerful interests to lobby the
state legislature to waive its sovereign immunity to patent cases. It
could threaten to withdraw business and capital from that state. The
real losers will be the weak, the disorganized, the disabled, and the
single individual who does not have the power and wealth to hire
lobbyists and lawyers to fight these cases, particularly now that law-
yers know they can no longer get a fee through any damages. Edel-
man v. Jordan already demonstrates how hard it is for the poor to
overcome sovereign immunity barriers.
87
The other real loser will be the states. To the degree that the na-
tional government cannot regulate the private sector because of fed-
eralism concerns, the states have less power to implement reforms.
Unlike governments and labor, capital is very mobile. One of the
real powers of states is to experiment, to create more humane ways
to regulate capitalism. They are already under huge pressure to pro-
vide tax cuts and subsidies to corporations who play one state off
against another (not to mention Mexico and Haiti). States will be
less likely to consider progressive legislation because they know
there is less chance that one day Congress may make their law a na-
tional baseline that can be effectively enforced by individual litiga-
tion. Thus, on a very fundamental level, states do not have sufficient
power to protect either their citizens or their own power if they can-
not constrain capital mobility by slowly raising the playing field in-
side and outside their boundaries. With less possibility of raising the
ethical standards of capitalism, the states will be more likely to race
to the bottom in terms of regulatory influence.
Simultaneously, the Court's decisions may give the states more
power than they should have. Probably the most important
87. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment constitutes a bar to the lower court's decree ordering retroactive
payments of benefits wrongfully withheld).
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remaining substantive Eleventh Amendment issue is whether private
parties will be able to sue states and their agents for violations of in-
ternational treaties. After all, there is no obvious reason why the
treaty rights protected by Article I Section 10 of the Constitution
should be immune to the Eleventh Amendment when basic constitu-
tional and federal rights under that Article have already been crip-
pled. The Court may soon have to decide if states can ignore GATT,
NAFTA, and, perhaps one day, the WTO. Although I find these in-
ternational institutions to be nefarious and perhaps even unconstitu-
tional on other grounds, I do not think that the states should have the
power to turn our foreign policy into chaos. In 1785, James Madison
wrote a letter to James Monroe setting forth the need for federal su-
premacy over international trade:
Viewing in the abstract the question whether the power of
regulating trade, to a certain degree at least, ought to be
vested in Congress, it appears to me not to admit of a doubt,
but that it should be decided in the affirmative. If it be nec-
essary to regulate trade at all, it surely is necessary to lodge
the power, where trade can be regulated with effect, and
experience has confirmed what reason foresaw, that it can
never be so regulated by the States acting in their separate
capacities. They can no more exercise this power sepa-
rately, than they could separately carry on war, or sepa-
rately form treaties of alliance or Commerce.
88
Although predicting outcomes is a risky business, my hunch is that
five of the Justices will somehow discover a way to protect the
American economic empire from state interference. And if they
don't, we may see the World Trade Organization telling all of us
what to do.
V. THE MAJORITY'S INTELLECTUAL FELLOW TRAVELERS-THE
DEMISE OF "RIGHTS TALK"
On a basic level, the Supreme Court has eviscerated the very
concept of "rights." In the foundation case Marbury v. Madison,
8 9
88. JAMES MADISON, Letter to James Monroe (Aug. 7, 1785), in WRITINGS
36-37 (J. Rakove ed., 1999).
89. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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Chief Justice Marshall stated:
If [the plaintiff] has a right, and that right has been violated,
do the laws of his country afford him a remedy? The very
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, when-
ever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of gov-
ernment is to afford that protection.90
The Seminole Tribe Court is not the first to believe that many Ameri-
cans rely excessively on their alleged "rights" to solve their prob-
lems. The left-leaning philosopher Richard Rorty has deplored the
culture's emphasis on "rights talk." 91 Some members of the Critical
Legal Studies Movement concluded that legal rights generate false
consciousness by convincing citizens that they had something of
value while continuing to be oppressed.
Admittedly, there is and should be much more to a political so-
ciety than legality. Legal rights alone will not make a decent society;
at some point too much law creates too many criminals. But a core
of legal rights remains a necessary, if insufficient, part of any just
system. Allow me to personalize the issue. I am a fifty-two-year-old
law professor teaching at a state university. In a few years, the Ohio
Board of Regents may fire me because they have concluded, perhaps
with empirical support, that teachers over the age of sixty are less
"productive" than their younger peers. Before Seminole Tribe, I
90. Id. at 162-63.
91. Richard Rorty, What's Wrong with Rights, HARPER'S MAG., June 1996,
at 15; see also RICHARD RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH 31
(1991) (repudiating the claim that "membership in our biological species car-
ries with it certain 'rights'). Mark Tushnet sees a bright future beyond the
world of rights: "The liberal theory of rights forms a major part of the cultural
capital that capitalism's culture has given us. The radical critique of rights is a
Schumpeterian act of creative destruction that may help us build societies that
transcend the failures of capitalism." Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62
TEx. L. REV. 1363, 1363 (1984) (footnotes omitted). Note how Tushnet be-
gins by condemning the "liberal theory of rights," which may well be war-
ranted, but immediately eliminates that qualifier by offering a critique of
"rights" in general. See also MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991) (giving a more Commu-
nitarian critique of "rights talk"). Other progressives see the continuing value
of rights. See PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS:
DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR 153 (1991).
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could engage in a very serious "rights talk" discussion with the Re-
gents by suing them for a violation of the ADA, a conversation that
would have begun with a legal presumption that I had been treated
illegally. Although I may still be able to sue in state court and Ohio
may waive its sovereign immunity, I no longer have as much power
to trigger that particular discussion-a discussion that used to end
not with words but action in the form of my reinstatement and dam-
ages for lost wages. These progressive thinkers, who want to throw
out the babies with the bath water because they believe America's
political culture remains profoundly immoral, will never convince
me that I am better off without that right.
The wariness of "rights talk" is an emanation of deeper radical-
ism. Many modem theorists condemn the Enlightenment for making
the "individual" the locus of analysis, the recipient of rights.92 They
prefer to elevate group and community rights above individual rights.
Although this generality is sometimes valid (to be effective, unions
must be able to limit some of the rights of their worker-members), it
is far too broad. Admittedly, many evil deeds have been performed
using such Enlightenment rhetoric as equality, liberty, fraternity, and
property. But that does not mean that those concepts, any more than
the sovereignty of the individual, should be tossed aside as illegiti-
mate obfuscations. By repudiating virtually all humane thought that
preceded them, many leftists seem to be saying: "The prior culture
was so evil that it can provide us with no guidance. Because I have
pointed this fact out to you and because I care for you, you should
follow my path (even though I really won't explain what I will do
until I get into power)." By stripping individuals of many of their
ancient constitutional and federal statutory rights while permitting
powerful interest groups to protect selected rights, the Seminole
Tribe Court has moved toward this position.
Another tendency of the left is to reduce issues to race and gen-
der. One need only skim the titles of major law review articles over
the past fifteen years to see the importance to the legal academy of
eradicating racism and sexism. In some ways, the war against racism
and sexism, as noble as it is, is profoundly conservative at this
92. The critiques of "rights talk" and "individualism" tend to go hand in
hand. See GLENDON, supra note 91, at 47-75.
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moment in our history. Upper-middle-class Americans across the
political spectrum can smugly claim that they and their Court have
repudiated those evil beliefs, cleansing our constitutional order of its
most egregious sins. Indeed, more progressive members are now ad-
vocating the rights of gays and lesbians, demonstrating once again
that America is at the cutting edge of diversity and tolerance. The
Seminole Tribe Court has constitutionalized this vision by holding
that individuals are limited to Fourteenth Amendment rights as de-
termined by the Court, rights the Court has limited to the Bill of
Rights, race, and gender. Thus, continuing problems of other forms
of invidious discrimination such as age discrimination, class war, the
concentration of private power, and imperial aggression disappear
from the constitutional radar screen.
Finally, the Seminole Tribe Court has created a variation of
South Carolina's Senator John C. Calhoun's "nullification doctrine"
that was a precursor to the Civil War. In response to facially neutral
tariffs that in actuality transferred huge amounts of wealth from the
southern agricultural states to the north and the west, Calhoun argued
that the states needed a veto power similar to the other sovereign
branches. 93 He concluded that a single state legislature could "veto"
any federal law it thought unconstitutional. This "veto" would re-
main in effect until enough other states ratified the federal Constitu-
tion to more expressly give the federal government the contested
power. In particular, Calhoun rejected the asserted federal power to
raise tariffs not just for income, but also to protect emerging indus-
tries.94 The modem Eleventh Amendment doctrine creates a similar
veto over the original Constitution as it applies to individual sover-
eignty. Any state legislature can cripple any federal law and any pre-
Fourteenth Amendment part of the Constitution by enacting a statute
asserting state sovereign immunity. Admittedly, the veto will not be
absolute. The federal government can still sue and individuals can
still seek injunctive relief (so long as Ex parte Young remains good
law under this neofederalist revival), but the basic structure remains
quite similar.
93. See JOHN C. CALHOUN, A Discourse on the Constitution and Govern-
mnient of the United States, reprinted in UNION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 129 (Ross M. Lence ed., 1992).
94. See id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Sometimes, a formal conclusion hardly seems necessary. The
beauty of the Tenth Amendment anticoercion doctrine, the Lopez
commerce case, and the Thornton dicta was their relative insignifi-
cance. Quite simply, the Supreme Court went "too far" when it be-
gan taking federalism seriously in the Eleventh Amendment cases by
stripping all Americans of numerous constitutional and statutory
rights. At the least, the Court should repudiate the Seminole Tribe
line of decisions. Moreover, Congress should not appoint any Jus-
tices who will continue this systemic degradation of individuality as
manifested through rights. It may even be necessary to amend the
Constitution.
